Abstract. Using game theory as research tool, this paper investigates deeply on price competition behavior between Multi-Channel Retailers (MCRs) and Pure Online Retailers (Dotcoms) on e-commerce market, elicits four kinds of market structures. Furthermore, it gives out perfect equilibrium prices as well as market scale under each condition of market structure. On this basis, two related propositions and two related conclusions are pointed out. First, it gets MCRs' and Dotcoms' critical prices. Secondly, as the penetrate rate of ebusiness increasing, two kind retailers' perfect prices will decrease, and there exists a stable relationship between the ratios of speed declining.
Introduction
At the beginning of Internet arisen, basing on the cognitive of Internet information technology's characteristic, people hold that on the e-business market, through investing even less than on traditional economic, consumers can search and face with more suppliers which may leads competition among suppliers. As a result, the consumers can get a lower price. In terms of economics, comparing with traditional off-line trade mode, e-business possesses higher market efficiency and lower market friction, reduces trade and search cost effectively, and consequently decreases suppliers' monopoly profit [1, 2] . The so-called "free-friction trade hypothesis" which can be tested directly through comparing price level on e-business market attracts many researchers doing theoretical and empirical studies on comparing price competition between online retailers and off-line retailers [3] . It can be concluded that existent researches on modeling the price competition between traditional retailers and online retailers have been developed sufficiently [4] .
However it is noticeable that, recent years, along with online market's expanding, more and more traditional retailers enter into B2C market. As multi-channel retailers (MCRs), they compete directly with pure online retailers (Dotcoms). But there is little research on the price competition between these two kind of online retailers within online market's internal. In existing references, an important analytical model and empirical analysis paper investigate on price competition between MCRs and Dotcoms based on Hoterlling model [5] . As the author said, their "analytic model is based on Hotelling's linear city framework and is limited by its assumptions. Relaxing some of the assumption can make the model richer, albeit more complex". Moreover, Friberg [6] gave out a more general model about price competition between MCRs and Dotcoms, and did relevant empirical researches. But in his research work, the effect of e-business's penetrate rate (equal to number of Internet users/total population) on price competition is not taken into consider. Therefore, regarding two kind of retailers internal e-business market as research object, based on Friberg [6, 7] and Cheng Yun's [8] modeling methodology about price competition between traditional off-line retailers and pure online retailers, this paper makes further development and generalization in order to get a more clear recognize on price competition between MCRs and Dotcoms.
According to O'keefe and McEachern's [9] consumer's decision making model, when consumers are conscious about the imbalance between ideal consuming and practical consuming, they face with channel choosing problem " where to buy" after decide what goods to buy for the purpose of offsetting this imbalance. Therefore, we suppose that: in the era of e-economic, when consumers who can purchase online choose their shopping mode (where to buy), there are two layers for them to make choice:1) purchase online or off-line; 2) if choose purchase online, then weigh the two online purchasing channels: MCR and Dotcoms. So researching on consumers' decision making between two online purchasing channels, this paper boosts existed results from working over price competition between traditional retailers and online retailers into two kind of retailers' competition in online market internal.
Hypothesis
Basing on previous statement, we first divide retail market into two parts: traditional off-line market and e-business online market. Then by setting up game model, compartmentalize market share among off-line channel and on-line channel respectively. Further, do more game analysis on price competition between MCRs and Dotcoms. In short, this paper divides the retail market into the following structures (figure 1): According to consumers' choices-online/offline and different parameter relationships, various market structures are built. Consumers who choose purchasing online will make second layer choices-MCRs or Dotcoms. Concretely, when t , Utility consumers gain when they purchase online; t , Utility consumers gain when they purchase off-line , there are (1-) degree of e-business is actualized; critical evaluate value of consumers who choose e-business consumers who choose purchase online when t , there are (1-e )consumers who choose purchase online. For simple, under these two conditions, this paper analysis further on price competition between MCRs and Dotcoms.
For the consumers who surely purchase online (online consumer), there are two kinds of online retailers -MCRs and Dotcoms on e-business market, therefore they have to choose purchasing channel from MCRs and Dotcoms.
Suppose utility function that online consumers choose MCRs or Dotcoms 2) P m , commodity's price when consumer purchases on MCRs, P d commodity's price when consumer purchases on Dotcoms. 3) t m , commodity's opportunity cost coefficient when consumer purchases on MCRs (0< t m <1); t d , commodity's opportunity cost coefficient when consumer purchases on Dotcoms (0< t d <1); Therefore, consumers' critical value evaluations on MCRs and Dotcoms are respectively Here, the consumer whose critical evaluation value is m or on the right of the axis can choose both MCRs and Dotcoms which means (1-m ) consumers can choose either way. For these consumers, when they choose MCRs, it is necessary that -t m -P m -t d -P d that's (t d -t m ) P m -P d Therefore, when t d -t m >0, the consumer whose value evaluation is between ((P m -P d )/(t d -t m ),1)will choose MCRs, and the consumer whose value evaluation is between ,(P m -P d )/(t d -t m ) will choose Dotcoms. When t d -t m <0, the consumer whose value evaluation is between ,(P m -P d )/(t dt m ) will choose MCRs, and the consumer whose value evaluation is between ((P m - m , here consumers who choose MCRs finally is empty which means MCRs's market share is zero. We focus on analysis of competition between MCRs and Dotcoms in online market and this condition is excluded from our research area, so we don't take it into consider. Market Structure One: Under the condition that the number of online consumer is (1-) 
Because at this time, the number of consumer who choose Dotcoms is ,(P m -P d )/(t d -t m ) , it has been proved before that > e so it is not taken into consider.
Price competition in MCRs and Dotcoms form the market structure as follows (1-e) Here, the consumer whose critical evaluation value is d or on the right can choose both MCRs and Dotcoms which means (1-d ) consumers can choose both purchasing way. For these consumers, when they choose MCRs, it is necessary that -t m -P m -t d -P d , Still that (t d -t m ) P m -P d When t d -t m >0, the consumer whose value evaluation is between ((P m -P d )/(t d -t m ),1) will choose MCRs, and the consumer whose value evaluation is between ( e , (P m -P d )/(t d -t m )) will choose Dotcoms.
When the number of online consumer is
When t d -t m <0, the consumer whose value evaluation is between( e , (P m -P d )/(t dt m )) will choose MCRs, and the consumer whose value evaluation is between ((P m -P d )/(t d -t m ),1) will choose Dotcoms. 
Game analysis under four market structure
Using backward induction, we deduce two kinds of retailers' optimum prices and equilibrium solutions as follow:
The demands of consumers who choose purchasing channels of MCRs and Dotcoms are respectively:
Perfect price are respectively:
Therefore, equilibrium solutions are as follows: 
Come to following propositions:
Proposition 1: In the competition of e-business market that two kinds of online retailers coexist, four factors together decide the price of two kind online retailers:
retailers' cost C m and C d , , other cost parameters t m and t d that consumers perceive when they purchase from two kind of retailers, e-business market's scales and ebusiness penetrate rate . When two kinds of retailers' cost difference is lower than a critical value (2-s/v) (t d -t m ), prior retailers' price is lower than the latter's. When the difference between costs that coefficient consumers perceive when they purchase from two kind of retailers is higher than a critical value (C d -C m ) /(2 -s), prior retailers' price is lower that the latter's.
Prove:
and relationship between t d and t m of four market 2) Under all four market structures, there is: when other parameters except price that consumer' perceive when they purchase on Dotcoms t d >t m + (C d -C m ) / (2 -s), Dotcoms's price is lower than MCRs's.
3) Under market structure 1 and 3, when e-business market scale s< (2-( C d -C m )/( t d -t m )), Dotcoms's price is lower than MCRs's. Under market structure 2 and 4, when e-business market scale s> (2-(Cd-C m )/( t d -t m )), Dotcoms's price is lower than MCRs's.
4) Under market structure 1 and 3, when e-business penetrate rate >s/(2-( C d -C m )/( t d -t m )) , Dotcoms's price is lower than MCRs's; Under market structure 2 and 4, when e-business penetrate rate <s/(2-( C d -C m )/( t d -t m )), Dotcoms's price is lower than MCRs's; Finish.
Proposition 2: As e-business penetrate rate increasing, two kind retailers' perfect prices decrease and there is a stable relationship of ratio of decline speed; in market structure 1 and 3, the difference increase; and in market structure 2 and 4, the difference decrease.
Market 
Conclusion
This paper is based on model (Friber [6, 7] ; ChengYun et al. [8] ) that focuses on price competition problem between traditional off-line market retailers and pure online retailers, and develop it further into considering the price competition behavior of both Multi-Channel Retailers (MCRs) and Pure Online Retailers (Dotcoms) on ebusiness market. Furthermore, we calculate perfect equilibrium price of two kinds of e-business retailer under four types of market structure, introduce parameters that indicate the scale of e-business market, and discuss characteristic of the changes about pricing strategy and perfect price that belong to these two kinds of retailer.
This research not only consummates price competition behavior of doublechannel retailers on e-business market academically, but also provides theoretical foundation for further empirical research on e-business market pricing. Admittedly, we do not include other factors such as price competition behavior of MCRs's offline part and traditional offline retailers. It is worthy studying further on this part.
